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Section 1 
Proposal  
The work I produce during the M.F.A. course will be centred 
on image making as a process of communication. Exploring visual 
images as messages mediated by social conventions of expectation 
and language. Examining how visual images work to redefine the 
horizon of possibilities allowed the viewer by culture. 
This investigation will require theoretical research on 
questions of how society determines an individual's consciousness 
and the capacity of a mind so formed to intervene and alter the 
determining cultures world view. I define this field of research 
as materialism, more specifically the cultural implications of 
Historical Materialism. 
I.propose to base my theoretical papers on Marxist thought 
as it has been developed through 20th century Western thinkers, 
using these theoretical ideas for analysis of contemporary Australian 
culture. 
This study will be combined with my developing thought to 
produce visual images. These ideas will, once brought into being 
themselves, suggest and modify the course to be followed and so 
help to determine the destination of the work. 
The objective would be to make images which shift the 
historically generated boundaries of thought, the cultural paradigm 
within which thought of the world must take place. The method 
used would be to produce images that illuminate the socially 
determined and exclusionary nature of the cultural paradigm. The 
image sources will be popular cultural traditions such as comics, 
magazines and childrens illustrations. 
The aim is to make a body of work that as representation/ 
argument/communication will have been produced through the 
interaction of their art, my biases and your institution. 
Section 2 
Review of the Proposal  
During the final weeks of the course as I was assembling 
this documentation I reread my proposal for the first time since 
its acceptance by the school. The experience drew an involuntary 
groan from me which I suppose is a fair measure of •the ground I 
have covered during the course. I put the document to one side 
avoiding any thought of reviewing it until the very Last. 
Now however looking at the proposal again I can see that 
while I would express my aims differently I still agree with the 
general substance of the position then taken. 
The way I approach art in the proposal with deliberate 
weight placed on its social role is, I still think, the only relevant 
way of considering art in general. 
I would not now place quite the same emphasis on art as 
communication. That emphasis resulted from a view that content 
determined form. Consequently I stressed the role of content in 
art against those explanations of art that concentrate on form as 
the significant feature of art. 
However at that time I was using a fairly simple model of 
form and content. The position I now have is that an art object 
contains two contents. The first instance is a content that 
refers to whatever aspect of reality is being represented. In the 
second there is the material content of the particular tradition of 
art that is being developed through the work. It is from the 
interaction of these two facets of content, a conscious aim and an 
expressive tradition, that the form arises. It follows from this 
explanation that painting is more than just communication. 
The second last paragraph of the proposal stating the intent 
of my work reveals a degree of confusion in my thought. The way I 
present the idea of art having a social function could be read to 
suggest a mechanistic causal relationship between the work and its 
audience. This error had its root, I think, in the traces of 
avante garde ideas about art that I still held at that time. A 
work of art does not have the effect of changing the view of its 
audience. Art expresses in the aesthetic of the culture attitudes 
that the audience and artist intuitively feel. Art serves to 
crystallize these mutual feelings into a more complete understanding. 
Apart from these adjustments the basic ideas of the proposal 
have direct correspondence with the view I have of the works in my 
M.F.A. submission. 
Section 3  
J.V. Stalin Rides a Bike, 1985, 3.1 x 13 metres, Chalk and Pastel on Sandpaper 
Halley's Comic 
1985, 3.1 x 2 metres, Chalk and Pastel on Sandpaper 
M.M., 1985, 2.5 x 6 metres, Chalk Pastel Charcoal on Sandpaper and Newsprint 
The Materials  
When beginning the course it was my aim to extend my range 
of abilities. 	I wanted to work on a Large scale with life size 
figures. 	But in a way that would allow the work to grow and 
develop experimentally so that parts of it could be expanded or 
removed as the idea developed. 
Using sandpaper and pastels provided a way of achieving 
this. The sandpaper, readily and cheaply available in standard 
size sheets, enabled a large work to be produced in pieces in the 
studio. Sandpaper's surface has a grain that allows dense colour 
to be laid down directly with pastels and chalk, and because of the 
paper's toughness, extensive blending and correction are feasible. 
Pastels and chalks combine the quality of intense colour 
with the direct physical nature of drawing which seems to suit my 
way of working. 
J.V. Stalin Rides a Bike, 1985, Detail, Figures Life Size Chalk and Pastel on Sandpaper 
J.V. Stalin Rides a Bike 
1985 Detail Figures Life Size Chalk and Pastel on Sandpaper 
J.V. Stalin Rides a Bike 
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M.M. 
1985, Detail, Figures Life Size, Chalk Pastel and Charcoal on Sandpaper and Newsprint 
Halley's Comic 
1985, Detail, Chalk and Pastel on Sandpaper 
The Content  
My work draws from and makes reference to both the imagery 
of popular culture and art. 
The unifying theme of the paintings is an awareness of my 
existence as a part of a culture in motion. The rapid technical 
and economic development of contemporary industrial societies carries 
with it the potential for unexpected and sudden shifts in the outlook 
of social groups. 
I don't think of these newer meanings as arising from nowhere, 
they have their origin within the values of the changing culture. 
So while I don't know what the content of the next flip flop of 
culture will be I do know that it must develop from what already 
exists in thought. 
Consequently, assuming you want to give the future a hand, 
the place to look for its point of development is within the 
contradictory aspects of one's own responses to reality. 
Having chosen the various images that I think best express 
the opposing attitudes I have toward the particular issue I am 
referring to, I then work to enhance parts of the meaning that 
these elements hold for me. 
While I don't assume an audience with an identical biography 
to mine, I do anticipate that a generally shared cultural experience 
allows the possibility of engaging the interested viewer in an 
interaction with the picture. 
J.V. Stalin Rides a Bike 
1985, Detail, Figures Life Size, Chalk and Pastel on Sandpaper 
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Section 4 
Seminar One 
M.F.A. ART THEORY PROGRAMME 1984  
THE POSSIBILITY OF CORRECT KNOWLEDGE 
The Possibility of Correct Knowledge  
This paper had its beginning with my discovery of the use in 
contemporary cultural theory of linguistic analysis of meaning. The 
disruption of my certainties caused by this form of inquiry had its 
compensation in the stimulation I found in the works of theorists 
using the method. However, because structural theory effectively 
demolished my prior assumptions of the nature of meaning, I had no 
critical criteria with which to test the claims these theorists made. 
The aim when starting the research was to find a theoretical 
system based upon assumptions that were relatively uncompromised by 
linguistic analysis. Such a theory once found could be used as a 
viable bench mark against which the consequences of the structural 
approach to culture could be assessed. 
The system of ideas I have chosen to use here, or perhaps the 
system that has chosen to use me, is dialetical materialism. Marxist—
Leninist philosophy suited my purpose by being a rigorously defined 
body of theory. The view of consciousness contained in dialectical 
materialism is compatible in many areas with the idea of awareness 
described by linguistic theory. While at those points where the two 
theories clash Leninist theory, because of its combative nature, is 
unmoved and its precise formulation enabled me to clearly identify 
why there is no correspondence. By laying the two theories side by 
side for comparison my intention was to find the assumptions that are 
implicit in each theory and so to gain a better understanding of both 
systems. 
Linguistic Theory  
The intimate relationship between language and thought allows 
the linguistic theorist entry to the workings of the mind. 	Language 
provides a direct link with the mental forms that make a meaningful 
reality in thought possible. 
Modern linguistics defines language as a system of signs. 
The word or sign is a unity of two aspects. This dialectical unity 
is formed by the word's sound image, called a signifier and the 
mental notion the sound triggers, called a signified. 
The sign in both of its aspects is arbitrary. 	Words are 
arbitrary in the sense that there is no natural or inevitable link 
between a word and reality. Just as there are no natural or obvious 
sounds for a language to use as signifiers for various aspects of 
reality, so there is no inevitable link between the notions carried 
by the signified and reality. 
While it is clear from our experience that each language 
divides up the vocal sound spectrum in different ways in making its 
unique signifiers, it is not so readily perceived by a monolingual 
thinker that each language also divides the continuum of reality 
differently when expressing its notions. 
For example, with the English words 'river' and 'stream' there 
is a differentiation according to size. While the approximate French 
equivalent words fleuve and riviere are defined by their destination, 
a fleuve flows to the sea while a rivier is a tributary. 
The meanings expressed in the words of all languages divide 
the continuum of reality into different ideas. As all languages 
operate successfully for their users it can be seen that there is no 
obvious necessary or right way of thinking the world. 
However, if the meaning of a word is not directly derived 
from an external object what is the source of the meaning of words? 
The answer to this question can be found by returning to the example 
of the river and stream. 	To explain to a non-English speaker what a 
stream is it would be necessary to refer to its difference in size 
from a river. This explanation reveals that the identity contained 
in the word 'stream' owes its meaning to the word's relationship to 
'river'. It follows that the notion contained in the word stream is 
not itself an autonomous entity. Streams identity or existence as a 
meaning is dependent upon its place in a system. 
Words can only carry meaning as the result of a relationship 
with other words. 	A sign existing in isolation could not signify 
anything. 	The intelligibility of words is only possible through 
their place within a structure of relationships. 
Extending this with a further example, with colour we impose 
divisions upon the spectrum of visible light. 	Each of our colour 
concepts exists as a result of these cultural distinctions. 	Red 
exists not as an external thing or essence but as a negative gap in a 
system of relations. Other cultures can and do divide up the spectrum 
of light differently to produce different ways of thinking colour. 
As our perception acquaints us with a semantic field rather 
than the pure objective world then it can be considered that the 
world of objects is the product of language. In the sense that 
reality's articulation is determined by language. 
Consequently language cannot be thought of as an instrument 
with which a person expresses thoughts which have their source of 
existence elsewhere either in the objective external world or in the 
objective self; because both the external world and the self owe 
their identities and their existence to language's articulation of 
them. 
For the subject, the knower of experience, the known is not a 
relationship between the self and exteriority since both sites are 
dissolved by linguistic theory into a single semantic field. 
This field, our language, existed before our individual 
consciousnesses. For us to have a world at all is only possible 
because we have acquired a culture and its point of view. 
Our familiarity with the external world is an illusion made 
possible by our encultured thought. To take this socio-historic 
reality for an actually existing real, which thinkers as autonomous 
subjects, acting individually discover and act upon, is revealed by 
Linguistic theory to be an error. 
It follows from this that we can no longer look for the 
determining conditions that make society possible at the level of the 
autonomous subject. To understand individual experience requires a 
study of the social norms which make experience possible. 
The effect of this insight is to continue the process of 
decentering the subject in our theory, a movement begun by Marx. 
The subject loses its place as the centre and source of meaning; 
indeed the idea of the subject dissolves as its functions are attributed 
to the systems operating through it. 
Here linguistic theory carries us to a break with the traditions 
of thought dominant in European thinking since the seventeenth century. 
The perspective that makes society the result of individual behaviour 
is reversed, revealing that it is collective social systems that make 
behaviour possible. 
It can be seen from the foregoing that linguistic theory 
makes uncertain our meanings. It does so through explaining the 
conditions for the existence of meaning in a theoretically existing 
mind. A mind abstracted from practice by using a concept of 
language unconnected to any external referent. The dialectical 
materialist approach to human consciousness is, however, an explanation 
of the cause of meaning. Human consciousness seen from this viewpoint 
is a result of the activity of mankind within and as a part of the 
developing material continuum of objective reality. 
Dialectical Materialism  
Like linguistic theory, Marxist-Leninist theory sees the 
existence of consciousness' only being possible as a result of each 
individual's culture. A person finds a pre-existing spiritual 
environment implemented by culture. This environment is an objectively 
existing cultural object which the individual has to assimilate and 
in doing so the consciousness and will of the individual is moulded 
in the culture's image. Each separate sensual impression arising in 
a person's consciousness is only possible as a product of a refraction 
of the external world through a prism of social forms of awareness 
that the individual has appropriated. 
Reflection  
Consciousness is possible in matter because of the general 
attribute of matter called reflection. Reflection is manifested in 
the inorganic world as a capacity for bodies to change their internal 
states when affected by other bodies. For example, mechanical 
deformation resulting from a blow. 
In living things reflection becomes selective and is connected 
with information received. An elementary form of biological reflection 
is irritability as a reaction by the organism to exernal influences. 
Physiological evolution leads to newer forms of reflection 
until reflection reaches its highest developed stage with the ability 
for specific reflection of matter as an ideal copy. 	We know this 
stage of reflection's development as our consciousness. 
Our awareness of the world arises through interaction between 
people. The social factors of work and language caused the development 
of consciousness. Through the necessity of securing our material 
requirements, people are forced to act together in their labour. 
This leads to the co—ordinating of group action with ever greater 
levels of communication, resulting in the appearance of language. 
The arrival of language signifies a qualitively different 
form of reflection than that of animals. Speech is a material 
manifestation of thought: meanings that can exist for other people 
and, by virtue of that, exist for a given person. 
The social nature of consciousness is revealed in its unity 
with language. 	The socially developed language is the form of 
existence 	of human consciousness, an awareness that cannot exist 
outside of speech. 
However, consciousness is more than just language, for 
awareness reflects reality while language's role is to express the 
mental results of this reflection, raising it to the level of cultural 
meaning. 
With language, mankind has a way of generalizing reality in 
abstraction from its concrete sensorily perceived features. Our 
ability to think reality in concepts enables us to delve beyond the 
appearances of the world. We can seek out the regularities and 
connections between things and events, to discover the essence of 
phenomena. 
A culture's consciousness reproduces its reality in ideal 
images which can be related back to the objective world through 
subjective experience. In their practice individuals can bring 
their subjective image of an aspect of reality into comparison with 
that same aspect existing objectively outside consciousness. Through 
this interaction of practice, knowledge of the objectively existing 
real, outside of awareness, is constantly being modified and expressed 
as newly experienced knowledge by individuals. The individual is 
therefore both constituted by society's world view and also its bearer 
and developer. 
Practice  
From the dialectical materialist viewpoint consciousness owes 
its origins and development to human social interaction in labour. 
It is only through the material interaction of labour with nature 
that any idea or attitude could be formed to nature. 
Practice is therefore the mediating link between objectively 
existing external reality and its ideal reflection in thought. All 
meaning arises from practice and develops upon a practical basis. 
Mankind cognizes nature in order to subjugate it and turn it 
to our services. 	Human practical activity involves material contact 
with natural objects. 	For example, to alter a stone, so as to make 
an axe, reveals the specific properties of stone. 	This empirical 
data is a penetration into nature's secrets and results in an increasing 
control of reality. 
To set a labour goal, say of reproducing stone axes, requires 
the existence in thought of an ideal image of the manufacturing process. 
This ideal model is not simply the expression in words of the process, 
rather it is an adequate experiential knowledge of the method. An 
awareness of the concrete material interaction of human stuff and 
stone needed to reproduce the object in space. 
Making anything presumes a co-ordinated mental programme of 
action combining both the possibilities of human dexterity and energy 
with the properties of the material to be changed during the activity. 
The mental image of the world produced through practice, must be an 
ideal which is made from the united objective properties of two objects. 
In the case of the axe the two are social man and stone as they exist 
in the process of production. Consequently consciousness of the 
world, the ideal image we have of reality, cannot be thought of as a 
purely mental image conjured out of a disinterested contemplation of 
raw nature. 
Therefore acceptance of the idea that practice is the mediating 
link between the mind and externally existing reality carries with it 
the implication that the reality known in consciousness should itself 
be thought of as practice. 
From this position it can be seen that the subject and object 
of knowledge is not nature in the raw but nature, both the human 
identity and its world, being transformed by practice. An aspect of 
objective reality that lies outside of the expanding sphere of practice 
generated knowledge, cannot be known in thought. 
As a result of this view, the function of awareness is not to 
seek information from a static given reality, since the world seen in 
consciousness is not an objective exernal reality as it exists from 
God's eye view, but rather a humanized mental terrain. A field of 
view that past generations of humans have produced as their practice 
illuminated the specific areas of their activity. 
It follows from this view that reality exists in our minds as 
dead identity. A map gained from past human practice is the starting 
point for our living thought as it begins each moment of present 
activity. The purpose of cognition is then not to contemplate the 
world as it appears to exist because that is merely the trace of past 
practice. Rather the function of thought is to transform the world 
and, in so doing, the basis of knowledge will itself change. 
The Concrete  
Practice in its social entirety produces a cultural reality 
carrying people within its trajectory. At the beginning of every 
labour process a goal is posited so that at the activities end we get•
a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at 
the activity's commencement. 
This image of a needed and desired future can only exist and 
be expressed because of a specific socio—historic consciousness. A 
social awareness that is itself the product of past practice. In 
carrying through our labour aims we effect change not only on the 
material with which we work, but also, in the realizing of our purpose, 
we change slightly society's reality and consequently its future needs. 
A newer goal successfully achieved confirms the method used 
to satisfy the desire. This method becomes a necessary practice if 
people are to achieve their desired future, an objective concrete 
reality to which people must subordinate their wills. The things we 
need, our desires, are meanings generated by past practice and thus, 
in order that we fulfil our desires, it is necessary to understand 
the concrete nature of the existence of human needs within our present 
practices. 
The Concrete in Thought and Reality  
Because mankind does not act upon nature from outside but 
confronts it as one of its forces, human material activity is linked 
at every stage with, and mediated by, objective reality. Consequently, 
since practice produces our ideal, forms of thought governing people's 
action in practice, are the reflections of the real laws of the 
objectively existing world. 	Subjective consciousness realizes these 
regularities in thought as reason and logic. 	So the rules of 
thought transpire to be also the general rules by which nature itself 
develops, revealed to mankind by their practical, activity transforming 
nature. 
The forms of human thought have been laid down by history. 
They have objective existence, independent of the will and 
consciousness of individuals to whom the rules of thought are 
counterposed as the structure of an historically developed system of 
culture. An individual can think only in so far as he or she has 
appropriated the logical determinations historically moulded before 
them. 
Knowledge  
Immediate contemplation of the objects of nature itself is 
bound up with the features and forms that have been stamped upon it 
by the transforming activity of mankind. 
Both the contemplating mind and the world contemplated are 
the products of history. Consequently the real object for human 
contemplation is the forms of activity of the social transformation 
of nature. 	Contemplation is always immediately concerned not with 
objects, but the objective activity on society's objects. 	It is 
precisely the alteration of nature by mankind that is the most essential 
and immediate basis of human thought. 
Truth 
Truth is a property of human knowledge in relation to an 
object. The world itself is not true or false, truth always refers 
to our knowledge of things not the things themselves. 
Because the reality of dialectical materialism is seen as the 
product of a developing practice, truth is not understood to mean an 
exhaustive and complete knowledge entirely coincident with an external 
object. 
In a developing reality, knowledge to be truthful, must reflect 
the process of that reality's transformation. For Marxist—Leninists 
true knowledge is a maximal coincidence of the understanding of some 
limited part of the world at a moment in its development within our 
practice. Such knowledge, if it is true, will be borne out by 
practice and when it is proved by practice, it can then be considered 
objective knowledge. 
Objectively true knowledge is a unity of the two aspects, 
relative and absolute truth. The absolute end of this unity reflects 
properties, qualities and laws of reality, and cannot be disproved in 
the future because its objective content does not depend upon 
consciousness. The relative end of the unity of objective truth is 
the human expression of the knowledge's content and consequently is 
always an historically specific statement of meaning. 
Seen from this viewpoint truth is not a static state of knowledge 
but a process of ever deeper reflection of the practical transformation 
of reality by labour. 
• 	 Because of the material—mediated nature of practice produced 
thought the solution of the problems of practice always involves us 
in being forced to think in ways determined by matter. Logical 
necessity drives a road for itself and so long as practice lasts, 
ever truer knowledge is the inevitable path of human thought. 
Having laid out the basic views of thought held by linguistic 
theory and dialectical materialism, it becomes possible to arrive at 
some conclusions about their differences. Linguistic theory has the 
merit of mak'ng explicit the prior assumptions that lie implicit in 
all thought. Using that theory, it is possible to achieve a degree 
of objective separation from one's own thought, to stand aside and 
watch the way your meanings are cobbled together in order to make 
sense. 	I find this a liberating release from the obligation of 
seriousness that permeates our cultural identity. 	However, this 
escape in no way excuses us from the imperative of making sense. 
The theory's bright promise of liberation through the subversion of 
meaning, boomerangs on its users to become a denial of the validity 
of any deliberate purpose or action. 
This weakness is exposed in much of the writing of linguistic 
cultural theory. The fault has its root in the abstraction of 
language from reality: when considered as an isolated thing, idealism 
takes over and the theory becomes theology. 
The Marxist-Leninist view of consciousness avoids an abstract 
identity by immersing the mind within, and as a part of, the developing 
social totality. Linking awareness at every point with a concrete 
reality of which it is a part, dialectical materialism is able to 
provide a fully developed understanding of material reality. This 
commitment to an austere and rigorous materialism enables the system 
to maintain the objectivity that makes it Theory with a capital T. 
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Section 5  
Seminar Two 
M.F.A. ART THEORY PROGRAMME 1984 
THE MOVEMENT OF THOUGHT 
• The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete  
The outlook of the dialectical materialist assumes that in 
the objective world there are no things existing in isolation, all 
objects have universal links with the rest of reality. Objective 
reality exists as a unity of interacting things which are found in 
the form of related groups, the sub—systems of reality. 
Each group -of things is a relatively discrete unity the 
identity of which is determined by the interaction of its component 
parts. Similarly the nature of each particular thing within a 
system is determined by the role it plays in the processes of its 
unifying system. 
The interaction of things within each unity causes that group 
to change and this movement through the infinity of links between 
the things of reality leads to the overall motion and development of 
the objective world. 
Society is a sub—system of reality, an object developing 
independently of any awareness we may have of it. However, because 
our consciousness is the result of our material practice, awareness 
itself is mediated by objective reality. 
Therefore the mind is a developing part of the social system, 
and because the content of awareness is an image of matter as it 
undergoes transformation through practice, forms of thought such as 
reason and logic are reflections of the rules and regularities of 
the nature of objective reality when it undergoes development. 
It follows that by correctly deducing the nature of thought 
it becomes possible to realize the course both of society and its 
knowledge as it unfolds. 
Reality  
Accepting the idea of a practice—produced consciousness of 
reality, it is clear that our mental images of things existing in 
the external world reflect only those aspects of the object that 
have been illuminated through our practice. We can onLy have 
defined those facets of each thing that have been specifically revealed 
by the course of our activity. 
Consequently our awareness of things, their appearance as 
mental images for us, is never a complete knowledge of the thing as 
it actually exists. We can know an object only in so far as our 
practical needs have illuminated it for us. 
Therefore the image of the world as it appears in our minds 
is illusory in the sense that reality itself does not exist as the 
external vista of understood meaning perceived by our consciousness. 
The field of knowledge that constitutes our mental image of 
the world is a geography of reality mapped by our practice thus far 
in its development. Reality exists for us as an internal image 
rather than an external world. 
A newer meaning emerging into our consciousness should not 
be considered as something purely existing 'out there' which has 
been freshly discovered. Meaning can only arise from a process of 
differentiation within the already existing interiority of our minds, 
not as a direct perception of raw nature. 
Practice—produced reality is a coherent system of mankind's 
relation to nature. An articulated concreteness organised in itself. 
Our thought is the precise and direct expression of this system of 
society and things. 
As a result of this insight the philosophical problem of the 
relation of abstract thought to concrete reality ceases to be one of 
the relation between a verbally expressed abstract idea to an 
externally existing sensorially given concrete thing. Instead it 
emerged as the problem of the relationship between the discrete 
elements of the humanized mental geography called reality; the 
question of how the internally divided aspects of our concrete reality 
relate to each other within the whole. 
It can be seen that this formulation of the relationship 
between the mind and objective reality involves us in a break with 
the traditions of thought dominant in our culture. 
We usually consider the sensorially perceived objective thing 
given in perception to be concrete. While thought about the thing 
is seen as abstraction, by speculating mentally, we move away from 
the hard empirical facts and thought becomes mere opinion. 
Marxism reverses this hierarchy by making the directly 
perceived thing abstract, while the process of cognizing the thing's 
true meaning as it exists as an element of the reality of practice 
is seen as the elevation of thought to the level of concrete knowledge. 
The Concrete  
The concrete is the name given to each of reality's systems 
of relations within which particular things exist. Because the 
unity defines the role played by each of its component parts, the 
system of relations in effect determines each thing's identity. 
That a thing can be this particular thing involves it being part of 
a particular set of relations. 
Because a thing can only exist as an identity for itself and 
for us as an element of a certain system, it is always perceived as 
an individual manifestation of a certain set of relations at a 
particular moment in the development of the system. 
Consequently the system itself must be regarded as logically 
primary to each of its component things. For a thing to be understood 
correctly requires that it be interpreted in this way. 
The Abstract  
The opposite of the concrete is the abstract, a thing is 
abstract as it exists in reality and as it appears in perception at 
each separate and relatively isolated moment. 
An object seen under such circumstances is abstracted from 
the identity-giving relations of its system, separated from the 
reciprocating movement it has with the other things of that system. 
If a thing is explained as it appears without regard to its defining 
system, only one-sided abstract knowledge can emerge. 
The Concrete in Thought  
While the concrete is primary with respect to the abstract, 
both in the objective system and in thought about the system, the 
concrete is not itself a thing. The concrete can exist only 
through its discrete elements as their specific combination of 
synthesis and unity. 
The concrete system can never be directly reflected in 
thought, it exists in thought only as a unity of diverse definitions. 
Each definition records a moment actually distinguished in the 
existence of the structure. 
Consequently mental reproduction of the concrete is realized 
as a movement from the abstract to the concrete. This movement is 
achieved through the logical combination of particular definitions 
into an aggregate, overall theoretical, picture of reality. 
For example the star and planets of our region of space 
•exist abstractly as separate things at each isolated moment. However, 
the mind by logically combining these fragments of empirical abstract 
data forges the diverse definitions into a concrete structure and 
reveals the unity of the solar system. The system of relations 
that gives each of the planets and their star their specific identity. 
Once expressed and accepted, this theoretical explanation of 
the relationship of these astronomical bodies to each other becomes 
a part of our view of reality and permeates our thought. At the 
mention of the solar system each of us can conjure up a mental 
model, or meaning, of the system. However, no—one has ever seen 
it. Even if it were possible to proceed to a position in space 
from which the solar system could be observed it would look nothing 
like the image we have of it. Nonetheless, by imposing our 
theoretical model upon the empirical data we could perceive the 
system. 
The ascent from the abstract to the concrete is the mode 
whereby thinking assimilates the concrete, reproducing it as the 
mental image of the concrete. 
The Notion 
As can be seen from the foregoing, cognition moves from the 
particular to the general. In practical thought the abstract 
appearance of the thing to be worked upon is the first stage of its 
cognition. 
The object appears as a mental image or notion which is the 
identity of that thing produced by past human interaction with that 
particular aspect of reality. The object always arrives in 
consciousness as a socially implemented contemplation. 
However, the notion is not the goal of thought, the mental 
appearance of the thing is the raw material of our activity's starting 
point. The thing under consideration can only be acted upon and 
transformed in reality to the degree of our control over it. The 
scope of practical activity is tied to the level of our understanding 
of the object to be worked on. Our knowledge or degree of control 
over things is only possible because of our ability to determine 
their identity—giving systems. This occurs as the content of our 
notions is enhanced by concepts. 
The concept works by logically processing empirical data to 
bring the abstract thing in question into a correspondence with the 
way it exists as a part of a developing system. 
The Concept  
The concept is not itself a thing, it has no empirical 
identity, concepts exist as a special form of consciousness through 
which empirically stated facts are expressed more concretely. The 
concept works to ensure that things are considered with regard to a 
property which each thing has specifically as an element of a system. 
Concepts can be thought of as an illumination of the things 
of the mind made possible by our experiential awareness of the 
recurring regularities of the objective world. The rules of matter 
that we have detected during our practical interaction with matter 
are expressed through concepts as an aggregate of ideas such as 
cause, possibility, quality, property, quantity, necessity, etc. 
By using these rules of objective reality's systematic 
development, the mind breathes life into our socially received 
abstract notions. Concepts enable us to manipulate reality 
successfully and to mentally reproduce the unseen systems they hint 
at as our explanatory theories. 
Through the use of concepts such as cause and effect, specific 
events can be given connections they would otherwise lack. The 
sensually given diversity of reality is given its meaning and order 
as the concept articulates it into a unity. 
The ordered meaning of our world view results from the ability 
of concepts to give us theoretical models expressing the systems 
that give each thing its identity, these systems are the objects' 
defining universal. 
The Universal  
If a thing is explained without reference to the concrete 
interconnections that constitute its genuine nature, only abstract 
knowledge is obtained. 
As the identity of each particular thing is determined by 
its role in a system, it follows that a full understanding of an 
object requires that its system or universal be revealed. 
However the concrete universal exists only through its 
discrete elements, consequently it itself is not directly observable 
and so must be deduced logically. 
To find the system of a thing one analyses it from the 
standpoint of its anticipated universal, to single out in the object 
what it is that constitutes its universality. 
For example people seeing a planet moving across the sky at 
first might perceive no connection with the Earth. The thing and 
its observation point may well be two separate and unrelated entities 
and no awareness of a universal connection will be possible. 
However, over time the regularities of the passage of the planet 
might emerge in consciousness, leading to the conclusion that a 
relationship existed between the motion of the planet and the Earth's 
position. From this insight a system of relations or a universal 
that would explain the events can be realized. 
The awareness of a relationship makes it possible to produce 
a theory that tells us why the planet appears as it does, its 
identity, and conversely, why from where we are viewing it, it Looks 
that way, which gives our planets identity. The two objects define 
each other as opposites in the system, their relationship is a unity 
of opposites. 
In this example to find the universal we began with an abstract 
notion, a light in the sky, with whatever meaning-content society at 
that time gave it. We analysed it to single out the aspect or 
identity that makes it a part of a system, its perceived regularities. 
Having defined this facet of the existence of the thing we are able 
to use our conceptual awareness of the rules of reality's systematic 
development to deduce its opposite. The opposite is the other 
polarity of the relationship that is giving both things their identity. 
As the newly revealed system emerges as an explanatory theory, 
its elements take on the meaning given by the theory. The things 
are now seen in people's minds as notions whose meanings become a 
part of the world view of society. 
It can be seen from this that it would be useless to try and 
explain reality from its appearances, as though such notions were 
pure reality. Because the content of our mental images refers to a 
thing only as it is perceived, as an identity within a theoretical 
model. 
As human practice develops, ever greater complexity of 
empirical fact is revealed. 	These facts have to be explained and 
contained by existing theories. 	Periodically the newer data 
overwhelms the explanatory power of a theory and bursts it. 	A 
newer theory must emerge to illuminate the facts with a different 
light as the content of our notions deepens. 
The Movement of Thought  
For an empirical fact to enter consciousness as a meaning, 
it is dependent upon our theories. Meaning is the unity produced 
by the dialectical interaction of facts and theories. 
We know where the facts come from, they arise 'out there', 
however, _where do the theories come from? Theories emerge from 
existing meaning as the complexity of the scope of practice constantly 
produces newer facts to test existing theories. When a theory is 
perceived to be no longer able to satisfactorily explain the array 
of facts, a newer explanation must appear if practice in that area 
is to be able to continue to develop. 
However, the meanings, the mental tools we have to produce 
this more comprehensive theoretical expression of the same facts, 
are the product of past theory. A new theory, no matter how 
revolutionary its content may seem, is always a further development 
of values created by previous development. 
For example, a critical reinterpretation of the older 
explanatory formula of the cause of night and day which is, that the 
sun revolves around the Earth, produced the newer formula of the 
Earth spinning before the sun. 
The rational core of the old theory, that the origin of 
night and day could be found by explaining the relationship existing 
between the Earth and the Sun, remains unchanged by the new theory. 
All that has been discarded is the conception that the old theory 
comprised in itself an exhaustive expression of the essence of the 
facts. 
At the time of its inception the consequences of the newer 
theory included a radical shift in the world view of society, with 
its image of the place of mankind in God's universe. 	However, the 
newer theory was directly produced out of the concrete content of 
that past world view. 
Cognition rolls forward from content to content, world view 
to world view, each new result contains its own beginnings, in the 
sense that all past meaning can only have existed because of the 
relation between empirical facts of practice and its contemporary 
theory, or more precisely through the linking of the facts to their 
universal concrete system. As each development of theory is the 
deepening of our understanding of the correct place of each object 
in its concrete system, so the movement in thought from the abstract 
to the concrete is an ever truer reflection of the starting point of 
our knowledge. 
The notion preserves itself at each stage, raising the whole 
mass of its antecedent content. Our concrete knowledge of the 
world leaves nothing behind as it develops: at each new stage it 
enriches and concentrates itself upon itself. In the movement of 
knowledge we shed only our abstract explanations. 
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